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ON BALANCING FREE SPEECH
IN A DIGITAL CONTEXT*
by
ARGYRO P. KARANASIOU**
The  paper  argues  that  our  conventional  approaches  regarding the  right  to  free  
speech seem outdated when applied online. To draw this conclusion, the free speech  
architecture of two jurisdictions is closely examined: Despite their ostensible differ-
ences, the First Amendment and the article 10 ECHR seem to have developed a  
common legal mechanism regarding the protective scope of the right to free speech.  
In particular, they both define the right’s contours by adjusting its permissible lim-
its within a given context. Ultimately, the two jurisdictions perform a balancing  
act in order to outline the level of protection reserved for this right. The paper traces  
and analyzes three of the most frequently evoked balancing parameters: space, prop-
erty and state coercion. Eventually, it is demonstrated that all these three paramet-
ers are challenged in cyberspace; as a result they seem to be of little help for balan-
cing online speech. The paper therefore suggests adopting a new approach; digitiz-
ing our conventional human rights as the proper way of striking a fair balance for  
online free speech.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Having slept for twenty long years, Rip Van Winkle –Washington Irving’s 
fictitious character- wakes up in a new dawn. A stranger among strangers, 
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he returns to his village unable to find a point of reference; his outdated 
concepts can no longer be associated to this new environment he finds him-
self in. Tremendous changes have taken place during these twenty years; 
what had seemed to him as a night’s sleep was indeed a long period of tur-
moil, revolution and change. Law in the digital era seems to resemble this 
archaic figure of Rip Van Winkle in many accounts; while trying to catch up 
with the technological advancements of today it still maintains its outdated 
legal approaches.
Ever  since  its  inception,  the  internet  has  indeed been a  synonym for 
change. In many ways it has proven to be a distorting mirror for reality, of-
fering a virtual alternative. Law has been no exception to this as it has not 
remained intact in the digital era. In what follows it is argued that the cer-
tain judicial structures employed to give shape to the exercise of judicial rul-
ings are found to be reflecting understandings which may no longer hold 
online. The paper’s center of gravity is to be found in the fact that our con-
ventional legal approaches seem to be at odds with the digital context of 
rights. This general assumption will be further examined with particular fo-
cus on free speech: it will be demonstrated that the legal tools employed for 
striking a balance between speech and other competing rights appear to be 
substantially changed and to thus have gained new perspective online. In 
doing so the paper raises the often overlooked issue of the widening chasm 
between the classic theoretical framework for free speech and the current 
reality enfolding speech online. 
To establish this argument the paper examines three parameters, which 
are frequently evoked in the First Amendment as well as the ECHR free 
speech  jurisprudence:  the  triptych  of  space,  property  and state  coercion 
monopoly. These parameters serve as yardsticks for free speech, putting it 
in context. Is this triptych contested online or is it still a reliable juridical  
tool for determining the right’s contours?
The paper concludes that traditional legal approaches seem outdated in 
the digital era; the equilibrium between free speech and other rights such as 
privacy or intellectual property online should thus be recast in the light of 
their  digital  context.  The aim of this paper is  to highlight the need for a 
fresh perspective as to free speech online and to call for a digitization of the 
current regulative framework.
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2. THE ARCHITECTURE OF FREE SPEECH PROTECTION
The right to free speech is regarded a fundamental right and as such enjoys 
constitutional  protection across multiple  jurisdictions worldwide.  For the 
purposes of the current paper, two of the main free speech protective legal 
mechanisms  will  be  examined:  the  US First  Amendment  and the  art  10 
ECHR. As it will be demonstrated next, they both seem to follow a similar 
structural pattern in spite of their obvious differences. To establish this, the 
paper  follows the  methodology  suggested by Frederick  Schauer[1]  for  a 
comparative constitutional study; the two free speech jurisdictions will be 
examined and compared from two aspects: their substance and their architec-
ture. 
Substance determines the right’s protective scope and it is further linked 
to the right’s constitutional value. As to its substance,  freedom of speech 
bears  a  cultural  relativity,  which  is  attributed  to  the  political  and  legal 
norms prevailing in each jurisdiction.  This according to Schauer explains 
the American exceptionalism that values certain types of speech[2] which 
lay  outside  the  European free  speech  protective  scope.  History  has  also 
played a significant part in forming the substance of the right to free speech. 
For  example  the  First  Amendment came as  a  response to the draconian 
speech limitations imposed by the English Crown to silence its critics in the 
US colonies, such as the Seditious Libel Act[3]. As a result, the critical issue 
in the US approach to free speech is the state interference over the contents 
of speech. Thus, the substance of this right is shaped accordingly.
It should be noted from the onset that the two free speech jurisprudences 
do not share a common legal background. Namely, the First Amendment is 
a constitutional text whereas the ECHR is a convention of human rights. As 
a result the First Amendment considers free speech as a civil liberty[4] and 
guarantees its protection for the US citizens; on the other hand, the ECHR 
views free speech as a universal human right that should be enjoyed by all 
humans in a supra national level beyond the notion of citizenship[5]. This 
explains another rather striking dissimilarity between the First Amendment 
and  ECHR;  the  different  phrasing  of  these  two  legal  texts[6]:  The  First 
Amendment begins with a negation (“Congress shall make no law”) and 
thus seems to be protecting freedom of speech in a rather absolute way[7]. 
On the contrary, ECHR’s article 10 adopts a detailed “heavily circumscribed 
notion of free expression”[8] by stating clearly its permissible restrictions[9]. 
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In other  words,  as it  was noted earlier  the main concern of the US free 
speech framework is to regulate the interference of the state, whereas in the 
case of ECHR the focal point is the regulation of speech itself for maintain-
ing an inner balance with the other ECHR rights[10]. 
In terms of the Schauer’s ‘substance’ it  seems that the  substance of the 
right to free speech is different in these two jurisdictions as they seem to ad-
opt  different sets of priorities that are eventually reflected on their legal 
texts.  However,  the  architecture of  free speech in  both jurisdictions bears 
some remarkable similarities. In what follows, it will be attempted to trace 
these methodological similarities, which ultimately culminate in a balancing 
act performed in both jurisdictions. 
First, the two jurisdictions seem to be framing the right to free speech 
negatively. In the absence of a textual definition of its scope, it could be ar-
gued that they both define its protection by delineating the areas of its per-
missible  restrictions.  This  is  accomplished  in  three  stages:  Initially  they 
carve out types of speech that are either in the core of their protected right 
or in the periphery and thus their restriction can be justified. Of course their 
methodology at this stage is not the same; the First Amendment through its 
judicial review doctrines[11] employs a categorical approach[12] based on 
the content of speech; the ECHR on the other hand adopts a textual classific-
ation of free speech clashing interests by prioritizing their underlying val-
ues. At the same time though, they both seem to have the same result: they 
preliminary carve out two main tiers of speech protection; a level of high 
protection and a level of lower protection where more restrictions are justi-
fiable.
On a second level, the two jurisdictions attempt a doctrinal demarcation 
of the restrictions imposed on speech. By employing a number of tests and 
doctrines, the Supreme Court and the ECtHR evaluate the constitutionality 
of the state interference. Again, many of the doctrines adopted for this seem 
to be similar in both free speech jurisdictions. For example the strict inter-
pretation of the provisions in art 10 par 2 ECHR introduced in the Sunday 
Times v United Kingdom[13] resembles the First Amendment strict scrutiny 
standard for content based regulations as they both place the burden on the 
state to prove its claim of compelling interest. Going further, the ECtHR’s 
tripartite test, under which a speech restriction is examined in terms of its 
precision, legitimacy of its aims and necessity in a democratic society[14] 
bears a notable similarity to the First  Amendment precision doctrine[15]. 
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Moreover, the Strasbourg’s doctrine of proportionality of the speech restric-
tion to the legitimate aims pursued stands on the same line with the US doc-
trine of the restriction being “narrowly tailored”[16] to pursue its means.
To sum up, the two jurisdictions seem to be following a common pattern 
as to their free speech adjudication. Not only do they both define the right’s 
protective scope by drawing its permissible limits but they also evaluate the 
constitutionality of its proscriptions in a similar manner. Ultimately, they 
both perform a balancing act between the right to free speech and other 
countervailing interests[17]. Although the US constitutional adjudication is 
described as a more rule oriented[18] approach in contrast to a standard 
based balancing approach adopted by the ECHR[19], they both entail a bal-
ancing act; the room for discretion might be different but the balancing act 
itself is nonetheless performed in both legal jurisdictions. The difference lies 
in the fact that in the ECHR “the balancing methodology is contained dir-
ectly in the Article 10 (2)”[20] followed by an ad hoc balancing whereas the 
First  Amendment attempts a “definitional  balancing”[21]:  it  balances free 
speech with competing interests based on a prior textual demarcation of the 
right’s protective scope. That said,  a balancing act is  an architectural ele-
ment that these two legal frameworks have in common and this free speech 
balance will be the focal point of the remainder of the paper.
3. ON PERFORMING A FREE SPEECH BALANCING ACT
The inescapable need of performing a balancing act between free speech 
and its  competing rights has been noted on many occasions in the legal 
rhetoric of both jurisdictions.  The balancing exercise as to free speech has 
been  adopted  by  the  US  Supreme  Court  already  from  the  early  1950s. 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Dennis elaborates this doctrine: 
“The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the in-
terest in national security are better served by candid and informed weigh-
ing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, 
than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems 
to be solved.”[22] 
The Strasburg Court has also relied on this balancing act. In Goodwin v 
UK[23], the Court evokes an excerpt from one of Lord Bridge’s speeches, 
which describes eloquently this balancing act taking place.  Regarding the 
“interests of justice” in seeking a disclosure of s source protected by section 
10, Lord Bridge notes that 
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“[t]he judge's task will always be to weigh in the scales the importance 
of enabling the ends of justice to be attained in the circumstances of the par-
ticular case on the one hand against the importance of protecting the source 
on the other hand. In this balancing exercise it is only if the judge is satisfied 
that disclosure in the interests of justice is of such preponderating import-
ance  as  to  override  the  statutory  privilege  against  disclosure  that  the 
threshold of necessity will be reached.”[24]
As it has already been noted, this balancing act is a common point in the 
free speech architecture of both jurisdictions. The legal concept of balancing 
in general has been discussed in the works of many legal scholars[25]. Al-
though the broad theoretical debate of comparing values will  not be dis-
cussed here in depth, it should be noted that the task of performing a balan-
cing act is necessary in terms of defining properly the right under review. 
Although it is not clear whether it is eventually the potential for realization 
of rights[26] or their consequences[27] that are being weighed, it is widely 
accepted that  balancing  requires  a  proper  contextualization  of the  rights 
considered. In other words, performing this balancing exercise successfully 
one needs to place the rights in a proper context[28].
With regard to free speech in particular, it becomes clear that its context 
proves to be an extremely helpful tool for being able to evaluate this right, 
to strike the required balance with its competing rights and interests and 
eventually to decide on its scope under certain circumstances. In order to 
contextualize free speech, judicial review employs a series of parameters, 
which serve as yardsticks. For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on 
the frequently evoked triptych of space, property and state coercion mono-
poly. It will be argued that although this triptych has been widely adopted 
for striking a balance between free speech and other rights, such as privacy 
and intellectual property, it is now challenged online. Next, it is illustrated 
how this triptych is contested online and why maintaining our old views 
eventually leads to imbalances as to free speech online.
4. BALANCING FREE SPEECH: THE DECISIVE PARAMETERS
In determining the context within which free speech is to be balanced, judi-
cial review has frequently relied on the triptych of space, property and state 
coercion. Contrary to other parameters, such as the prevailing norms in a 
given context,  this triptych has been commonly accepted across multiple 
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jurisdictions as all  these three notions are eventually factual  indisputable 
elements. 
Space as a legal tool is a concept which dates back to the westphalian 
state-centric sovereignty[29]. The fact that the state in the post-westphalian 
era is expected to exercise absolute power within its territorial borders has 
given space a significant role as a juridical tool. The most notable example 
of its use in jurisprudence is the fact that space serves as the decisive factor 
for determining a specific jurisdiction. One can further note the importance 
of ‘locus’ in many areas of law, predominantly the international law as well 
as its association with other legal concepts, such as the “locus in quo” as to 
the act of trespassing in the English common law of torts. Regarding free 
speech, space is considered to be an egregious conceptual element of this 
right. From the ancient agora and the roman forum to Hyde Park Corner,  
the notion of space is intertwined with free expression; people have always 
had the need to assemble in a designated area for discursive purposes. Even 
the metaphor of “marketplace of ideas” dominating the First Amendment 
jurisprudence is indicative of the fact that spatiality is essential for the right 
to free speech[30].
Space as a balancing parameter for free speech is not by itself enough to 
outline its context and delineate the right’s protective scope. In this task, ju-
dicial  review  associates  spatiality  with  property  by  introducing  the 
public/private dichotomy. Namely activity is divided into multiple private 
and public spheres, which at times may overlap. In order to decide on the 
speeches’ proscribed limits, judicial review takes into account this distinc-
tion of space, following the private/public dichotomy. This dichotomy is in 
fact the manifestation of property; ownership of a certain space determines 
action  within  this  sphere  and as  private  or  public.  That  said,  space  and 
property  combined  introduce  this  public/private  dichotomy,  which  ulti-
mately contributes towards putting speech in a certain context. This contex-
tualization is reflected on the “public forum”[31] doctrine. The ability of the 
state to map free speech by determining certain public and non public for-
ums derives at large from the state’s ownership status of spaces[32].  It is  
thus made clear that space and property are the two legal assumptions that 
serve as the main coordinates for contextualizing free speech and drawing a 
balance with other rights. 
One could further note a third legal assumption that contributes towards 
placing  rights  in  the  proper  context  while  balancing  them.  That  is  the 
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concept of the state coercion monopoly[33]. In other words, this third legal 
assumption is an acknowledgment of the state’s sole power to enforce its 
free  speech  restrictions  in  the  name  of  protecting  a  countervailing 
interest[34]. The balancing act that free speech adjudication entails is guided 
from this  concept  as  well.  Besides  using  space  and property  as  juridical 
tools to outline the permissible limits to free speech, the relevant jurispru-
dence relies heavily on the understanding that the state is able to do so as it 
seems to be the sole source of coercion. 
This triptych of space, property and state coercion monopoly has always 
been an integral part of the balancing act performed regarding the right to 
free speech. It ultimately helps us to define free speech by revealing its con-
text. As it was noted earlier, judicial  review adjusts the right’s protective 
scope on grounds of its specific environment. In other words it outlines the 
right’s permissible limitations having first considered all these three para-
meters and the specific context they describe.  This is perceptible in many 
cases of private rights competing with free speech. Take for example the 
cases where free speech seems to be clashing with privacy interests. In order 
to decide on whether trespassing has taken place, judicial review contextu-
alizes the two rights before striking a balance. This means that to determine 
whether there has been an infringement on privacy, one would need to con-
sider the place that the incident under review occurred and its ownership 
status. Eventually the line is drawn premised on the ability of the state to 
implement  this  decision.  This  triptych is  also noticeable  in the balancing 
between free speech and intellectual property. Again, the concept of space is 
critical for the level of dissemination of the copyrighted material. Moreover 
property, besides underpinning the right to intellectual property is also a 
decisive factor for placing both rights in the proper context. Eventually, the 
state’s power to define the right to free speech through this balancing is  
guiding the judicial review.
In this section it  is  claimed that the ontologies of space, property and 
state coercion monopoly have dominated the free speech balancing exercise. 
By acting as descriptive parameters for the context within which free speech 
and other rights occur and collide, these legal assumptions help us contex-
tualize speech properly and weigh it against other rights at stake. Nonethe-
less, this triptych does not seem to hold online. As it will be argued next, all  
these three legal assumptions have become relevant in cyberspace. As a res-
ult they seem to be no longer useful as legal tools for striking a fair balance 
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for online speech. In what follows, it is explained in what way this triptych 
changes online and why it is problematic to use it as a juridical tool.
5. CONVETIONAL APPROACHES CHALLENGED ONLINE
It is often remarked that the internet has imbued law with great rigour as it  
seems to be putting into question our conventional legal approaches. As to 
balancing free speech, the frequently evoked triptych described earlier ap-
pears to be radically changed in the digital era. It would not be a hyperbole 
to say that the three axiomatic parameters of space, property and state coer-
cion monopoly are now shaken to the ground in the internet age. Although 
they were traditionally considered as unchangeable legal axioms that could 
outline the given context in which judicial review was to assess free speech, 
they now appear almost mutated online.
Beginning with the concept  of space,  the troubling implications of its 
definition  became  obvious  from  the  very  start  of  the  internet’s  history. 
Already in 2000, in the Yahoo! case [35], the judges noted the overarching 
challenge to define space in terms of jurisdiction. The case, a landmark for 
IT  law,  involved the  legal  action  of  an  anti-Semite  French  Organization 
against  the  auctioning  of  Nazi  memorabilia  online  hosted  in  Yahoo! 
webpage with global reach. When the US Courts discussed the enforcement 
of the French issued injunctions against  the US based Yahoo!  they were 
faced  with  the  question  of  determining  the  jurisdiction.  The  dictum  of 
Justice Fogel that the “Internet in effect allow more than one to speak in 
more than one place at the same time”[36] equals to an admittance that the 
legal assumption of space in terms of a geographical connection to a certain 
legal sphere could no longer hold online. 
This  problematic  change  in  spatiality  is  particularly  prevalent  in  the 
WikiLeaks case as well. Namely, when the US DNS provider “Every DNS” 
decided to withdraw its services[37] to WikiLeaks and pulled the plug off 
its website following political pressure, WikiLeaks managed to sustain their 
online presence in the following ways: Initially WikiLeaks transferred to a 
Swiss ccTLD [38], which directed users to a Swedish IP while having their 
content hosted by a French server[39]. Eventually, they enforced their Swiss 
domain name with DNS diversification. This means that they set up 14 au-
thoritative name servers[40] in eight different countries pointing to three di-
versely routed IPs, in Sweden, France and the Netherlands[41]. To this one 
could also add the over 1000 additional mirror sites [42], which voluntarily 
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displayed the WikiLeaks content on their websites. The WikiLeaks case il-
lustrates clearly that space as we once knew it  is  forever lost online.  Of 
course this is not to imply that cyberspace has created a different jurisdic-
tion or that it constitutes a place of its own [43]. What is highlighted here is  
that  the  internet  has  introduced a  multidimensional  notion  of  spatiality, 
which is utterly new and almost estranged to the concept of space used in 
the analogue world.
Regarding the concept of property, it is equally acceptable that it is a no-
tion  almost  inimical  to  the  internet’s  infrastructure;  as  such  it  has  been 
severely questioned online. The basic structural features of the internet, “in-
teractivity,  mass  participation,  non  exclusive  appropriation  and  creative 
transformation”[44] are directly opposed to any proprietary regulating re-
gime. It is no secret that some of the most innovative and successful projects 
online owe their creation and development to the participation and collab-
oration of many users together. Wikipedia, Linux or even the very recent 
Icelandic Constitution: these are all projects drafted online based upon con-
tribution, open source, modification and peer review. Copyright itself has 
been altered online; more and more it  is  now gradually moving towards 
‘copyleft’[45], the licensing system that ensures information will remain free 
for further copying as long as this is not done for commercial purposes. 
Last, as to the state coercion monopoly, it is to be noted that the state 
does not seem any longer to be the ruling deity online. A series of facts since 
the  mid  nineties  paint  a  precise  picture  of  this.  The  doubt  upon state’s 
monopoly online was first cast in the well known “Declaration of Independ-
ence in Cyberspace”, signed by EFF’s [46] John Perry Barlow in 1996. This 
libertarian  manifest,  addressed  to  the  “governments  of  the  industrial 
world” adopted a hands-off the net approach in stating that “you have no 
moral  right  to  rule  us  nor  do  you  possess  any  methods  of 
enforcement...”[47] Although Barlow’s Declaration is considered to be out-
dated in today’s commercial World Wide Web, it nonetheless seems that the 
cyberspace governance altogether is now oriented towards a model of inter-
national cooperation beyond state-centrism; this was the WSIS 2005 main 
conclusion, which further facilitated discussions over an online governance 
framework away from the state-centric model. In the following years, many 
online governing online bodies were suggested, ICANN, UN and ITU to 
name a few. In general the relevant discussion revolves lately[48] around a 
multi-stakeholder online governance model. Although it is outside the re-
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mit of this paper to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of all the models 
suggested,  these  developments  are  mentioned in  the  light  that  the  state 
seems to have lost its monopoly of exercising power online.
6. COULD MAINTAINING OUR OLD LEGAL VIEWS LEAD TO 
IMBALANCES?
Turning back to the main argument of this paper, it has now become more 
obvious that the legal tools used for balancing free speech appear to have 
indeed altered their meaning online. To carry this argument further, it will  
now be demonstrated that maintaining the old views could lead to imbal-
ances with significant implications for online free speech. In other words, 
ignoring the fact that rights are not properly balanced online could result to 
encroachments on free speech. 
If indeed our hypothesis holds and the balancing triptych has gained a 
new meaning online then maintaining our conventional legal perspective 
will eventually result in misplacing the rights to be balanced in the wrong 
context. To validate this hypothesis we will now briefly examine two sets of 
rights frequently clashing with the right to free speech online: privacy and 
intellectual property
Examining the online controversy between the right to free speech and 
privacy, it is generally observed that the balance struck promotes the latter, 
almost at the expense of the former. While maintaining a proprietary view 
of  the  right  to  control  one’s  private  data  and  ultimately  to  “be  left  
alone”[49], the right to privacy online seems to be gaining ground against 
free speech. This tendency is reflected rather clearly on the latest legislative 
initiatives regarding online privacy. The current EU proposal to introduce a 
“right  to  be  forgotten”[50] into  a  revised  EU  Data  Protection  Directive 
provides us with a very good example. Even though it would be technically 
unfeasible to implement such a regulation online[51], speech seems to be 
overly restrained.  In particular,  regarding the freedom of the press to in-
form the public and archive its material for future use, the restrictions of 
this legislation are particularly problematic. It becomes evident that the bal-
ance drawn is rather unfair for free speech[52]. By ignoring the fact that the 
public and private dichotomy is not that easy to discern any longer online, 
law appears to be stubbornly insisting on applying online disputable con-
cepts such as spatiality and property. As a result the relevant balancing act 
has troubling implications for the right to free speech online. 
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Unfortunately the same is to be noted for another online competing right 
to free speech: intellectual property. Most of the latest legislative initiatives 
in this field have been criticized severely for imposing tremendous restric-
tions on free speech in order to protect copyright infringement online. Take 
for example the controversial “gradual response” regulative model that is 
adopted in a series of legislative texts implemented worldwide[53].  Only 
last June,  Frank La Rue, UN’s Special  Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, notes his con-
cerns regarding such legislations implemented in France and the UK. In his 
report to the Human Rights Council he considers the French “Three-strikes-
Act” and the UK Digital Economy Act as legislations that have alarming im-
plications for intermediaries’ liability and the freedom of speech in general. 
He notes further that this kind of arbitrary blocking of content for protect-
ing  intellectual  property  online  eventually  “leads  to  self-protective  and 
over-broad private censorship, often without transparency and the due pro-
cess of the law.”[54] In spite of such alarming findings, the relative legisla-
tion continues to maintain its parochial views on property and spatiality. 
The latest example comes from the US: A few months ago, the Stop Online 
Piracy Act (SOPA) was introduced in the US Senate and was later on rejec-
ted following intense lobbying pressure caused mainly by online entrepren-
eurs. Under this Act it would have been made possible to obtain a court or-
der for the US ISPs to deny access for all their subscribers to absolutely any 
national or foreign website that would be found to be having copyright ma-
terial. The implications for freedom of speech this Act would have if it be-
came law would have been tremendous.
The examples noted above are indicative of the fact that relying on the 
traditional legal parameters when balancing online speech leads eventually 
to the over-restricting this right. Hence policy models relying on the out-
dated concepts of proprietorship, localization and state centrism are partic-
ularly problematic for free speech online. More importantly, such legal ap-
proaches are also setting obstacles to the internet’s sustainability, as they 
seem to disregard the key factor of its growth and success: the uninhibited 
exchange of online information.
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7. CONLUSION: TOWARDS A DIGITIZATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS ONLINE
This paper has highlighted the legal approaches to free speech, its balancing 
methodology online and the problematic implications this seems to have for 
the right at hand. It has been noted that freedom of speech is outlined by its  
permissible limits, which are the result of a fair balancing with other com-
peting  interests  and  rights.  More  importantly,  this  balancing  act  is  per-
formed by placing the competing rights in  the proper context.  Although 
there are several parameters that are used to outline each context, these do 
not seem to hold online any more. Insisting on using these outdated views 
ultimately results in ignoring the rights’ context; the inability to strike the 
proper  balance  leads  further  to  an  over-restriction  of  free  speech  online 
without necessarily offering sufficient protection to its competing right.
Yet, if this is indeed the case and our current legal approaches can no 
longer  contribute  towards  striking  a  fair  balance  for  free  speech  online, 
what is their suggested alternative? Does this also imply the necessity to 
make new rights for offering sufficient constitutional protection to our fun-
damental rights like free speech in the digital era? It seems that the existing 
human rights protective framework can still efficiently shield our right to 
free speech online as long as we embrace this new digital context for speech. 
In the words of Professor Joel Reidenberg,  regulative problems in  cyber-
space –like the ones described earlier- 
“will absolutely continue to come up, until one or two things happens: 
Either  the technology companies  begin to build architectures  that  enable 
compliance with existing law, or the law begins to change”[55]. 
Understanding  better  this  new  environment,  in  which  human  rights 
function, clash and interplay can contribute towards striking a fair balance 
for free speech online. This involves trading our old legal approaches for 
new; spatiality for multidimensional  reality,  property for quasi-commons 
and state coercion monopoly for multi-stakeholder division of powers. Al-
though we could still utilize the existing free speech protective framework, 
we need to learn from the net’s structure. Its understanding will  help us 
contextualize online speech properly and eventually come up with a new 
deal for the right’s protection in the digital era.
On the understanding that free exchange of data is a structural element 
of the net architecture, it is essential to ensure a certain level of protection 
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for online free speech. To take this argument a step further, a policy model 
oriented towards maintaining a sustainable internet would be mostly con-
cerned with promoting the uninhibited data-flow rather than trying to regu-
late it with non digital-friendly legal tools and approaches. In other words, 
the focal point should be to protect online data-flow rather than to frame it 
in terms of property and spatiality. Insisting on using such outdated para-
meters carries the danger of over-restricting speech; in the long run keeping 
on to this ineffective legal approach, which ignores the right’s digital con-
text, would be particularly problematic for the sustainability of the internet 
as a whole.
Keeping in pace with technology is not an easy task for law; realizing 
however that the current legal approach should change, is a great first step 
forward. Online entrepreneurs seem to have already understood this shift. 
As Eric Schmidt, the Chairman of Google, observed last May in his speech 
addressing  the  eG-8  Forum  “Technology  will  move  faster  than  govern-
ments, so don’t legislate before you understand the consequences”1. The di-
gital era calls for adaptation of our old views and unless we realize this, the 
equilibrium for free speech online looks to be as fragile as ever.
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